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DANIEL BENOLIEL.

Israel and the Palestinian State: Reply to
Quigley
ABSTRACT:
This article replies to Professor John Quigley's
recent article on the rather dramatic controversy concerning
Palestinian statehood. The present article provides a
critical assessment of two pivotal Palestinian Unilateral
Declarations of Independence (UDI) initiatives as of 1988
and 2011. It does so both generally and with regard to the
territorial and border disputes underplayed by Professor
Quigley's supportive Palestinian statehood argument
altogether.
In the wake of the codenamed 'Arab Spring'
tentative spread of democracy throughout the Middle East,
regional law and order commands legal certainty. Thus,
while being sympathetic to the secessionist selfdetermination of Palestine under public international law,
this article offers critical assessment of the latter's unilateral
bypass of both relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions as well as the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral Oslo
Interim Peace Agreements. The article concludes that
neither argument to the contrary in support of unilateral
Palestinian statehood as put by Professor Quigley is legally
assured.
AUTHOR:
Professor Benoliel is an Assistant Professor,
University of Haifa, Faculty of Law.
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Introduction
The implications of future Palestinian statehood are
undeniably dramatic. They may impose on the jurisdiction
by the International Criminal Court over alleged war crimes
by either party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; they can
fundamentally change the legal status of the Holy Places in
Jerusalem and elsewhere in the Holy Land; they may
uphold crucial geo-strategic regional and national
implications related to Israel's security concerns; or they
may otherwise inflict on the geographical continuation of a
viable Palestinian state altogether.
In a thought-provoking article, titled Palestine is a
State: A Horse with Black and White Stripes is a Zebra,
Professor John Quigley directly replies to a previous article
by Ronen Perry and myself in the same volume 32 of the
Michigan Journal of International Law. Both of these
articles exchange competing considerations concerning the
abovementioned concerns.1

†
Assistant Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. I
thank Roy Sheindorf, Emanuel Gross, Ronen Perry, Uri Benoliel,
Yaara Winkler and Gal Sion-Dayan for their comments and advice.
For further information, please contact: dbenolie@law.haifa.ac.il.
Any inaccuracies are my responsibility.
1
See John Quigley, Palestine is a State: A Horse with Black and
White Stripes is a Zebra, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 749 (2011)
[Hereinafter Quigley, Palestine is a State]; Daniel Benoliel & Ronen
Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 73 (2010).
3

In his reply article, Professor Quigley tried to rebut
our earlier reservations doubting his presumption that a
Palestinian state already exists over the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in their
geographic entirety.
Professor Quigley most noticeably argues that no
later than the Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) of November 15, 1988, upon its wide
recognition by the United Nations and states worldwide, a
Palestinian state came into existence.2 Quigley's analysis
should conceptually refer to the right to effect the secession
of Palestine from Israel unilaterally, given the 1988
Palestinian UDI. In particular, it begs the questions
whether such a right can derive from the right of selfdetermination under international law and, if so, under
which limitations.
With the commencement of the sixty-sixth session
of the United Nations General Assembly last year, a
historic admittance of a newly born Palestinian State may
occur. That is, given a following 2011 implied Unilateral
Declaration of Independence initiative perceived through
2

See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 1 at 755; John Quigley, The
Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: the
Statehood Issue, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Quigley,
The Palestine Declaration]; JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF
PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
(2010); James L. Prince, The International Legal Implications of the
November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 681, 688 (1989); Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 81-87;
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Article 12(3) Declaration of the Palestinian
Authority, the International Criminal Court and International Law,
9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 301 (2011).
4

the submission of the application for United Nation
membership by the Palestinians on September 23, 2011.3
The following 2011 Palestinian UDI initiative, does not say
when exactly Palestine became a state, nor does it declare
Palestine’s independence anew; rather, it refers to the
November 15, 1988 Declaration of Independence.4
As no later formal declaration of Palestinian state
took place thereafter the critique over Professor Quigley's
adherence to the 1988 Declaration of Independence
seemingly remains relevant also after the subsequent 2011
Palestinian UDI initiative. Within the confines of this reply
article, additional highly questionable considerations set
forth in Professor Quigley's reply article are further
criticized.
I. Palestine Secessionist
Normative Framework

Self

Determination:

The

Professor Quigley's reply article is doctrinally rather
challenging and is incomplete on numerous levels. To
start, the accurate legal status of the nascent State of
Palestine (statu nascendi) arguably still remains a colonial
territory. This term is found within the definition of "newly
independent state" in the Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23, 1978. It refers
to any geographically separate territories that are dependent
upon and subordinate to a metropolitan territory of a state –
Israel in this case – in accordance with Article 74 to the
3

See generally Application of Palestine for Admission to
Membership in the United Nations, U.N. GASC, 66th Sess., U.N.
A/66/371 (Sept. 23, 2011).
4
It is noted however that Mahmoud Abbas is not titled there as
President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), but as
President of the State of Palestine instead. Id. at 2, 4.
5

United Nations Charter.5 Thus, the Palestinian-occupied
territories in West Bank, including East Jerusalem and
possibly the Gaza Strip, arguably still adhere to the latter
definition.
Professor Quigley analytically ignores the pivotal
distinction between two classes of colonial territory within
the United Nations Charter. In accordance with Chapters
XI and XII of the United Nations Charter, the two classes
of territories are self-governing and trust, respectively.
Both types of territories are referred to as "colonial"
according to the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)
in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 14, 1960.6
In the present case, the Palestinian right of selfdetermination distinctively makes a case in point for the
second class of such colonial territories, namely “trust
territories”, as covered by Chapter XII of the United
Nations Charter.7
The West Bank, including East
5

Thus a "metropolitan state" is the administering state of a colonial
territory. U.N. Charter art. 74.
6
A shorthand term sometimes used for colonial territories is
"dependent" territories. Moreover, none of the Articles of Chapter
XI and XII, actually use the phrase "right to self-determination".
Their concern was rather with the progress to self-government of the
peoples of dependent territories. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art 2(1)(f), Aug. 23,
1978, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 971 (defining "newly independent State");
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts, art. 2(1)(e), Apr. 7, 1983, 22 I.L.M
306 (defining “newly independent State”); see also id., arts. 15, 28,
38.
7
On the right to Self Determination see U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2
(“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”);
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on
6

Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, is included in the territories
formerly covered by the system of mandates under the
League of Nations, as provided for in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League. Article 22 of the Covenant
mandates fall into three classes. With one exception, the
"A Class" mandates (formerly parts of the Ottoman
Empire) had become or shortly after 1945 became
independent, specifically Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.
Unlike what Quigley describes8 under the Class A mandate,
the exception indeed includes Palestine, a British Class A
mandate.9 Following the British withdrawal from Palestine
in 1948 and a war with neighboring Arab states, Israel
became independent.10 The remaining parts of Palestine
Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No.
2, July 4 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1498 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter
Commission] (“[T]he principle of the right to self-determination
serves to safeguard human rights.”); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1988, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Mar.
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“All peoples have the right of selfdetermination.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), at 122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24 1970).
8
Quigley, Palestine is a State, supra note 1, at 755.
9
Article 77 of the UN Charter states that those mandated territories
which had not achieved independence were to be brought under the
International Trusteeship System through separate agreements. U.N.
Charter art. 77. In balance, like with the Palestinian case, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that there was no automatic
transfer of mandated territories to the trusteeship system.
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 128 (July 11).
10
See G.A. Res. 18/1, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/S/RES/18/1 (Apr. 23, 1990);
S.C. Res. 652, at 30, U.N. Doc. S/RES/652 (Apr. 17, 1990); See,
e.g., Georges Abi Saab, Namibia and International Law: An
Overview, 1 AFR. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3, 3-11 (1993). The territory
became independent as Namibia on March 31, 1990. Of the "B
Class" and "C Class" mandates, only one was not brought under the
7

were not brought under trusteeship, yet they are covered by
the rubric of self-determination. The International Court in
the 2004 Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion11 and
many United Nations resolutions note this distinction. 12
To be sure, the second class of colonial territories
covered by the United Nations Charter were non-selfgoverning territories. These were dealt with in Chapter XI
of the Charter. Article 73 of the Charter states they were
“territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government”. Beginning in the 1970s, the
international law of self-determination expanded the right
to independence to the latter class of colonial territories and
to people subject to alien subjugation, domination, and

Trusteeship system under Chapter XII of the Charter, namely, South
West Africa (Namibia). Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa). Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, para. 52 (June 21).
11
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, at 136, 183,
197, 199 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory]. See also, e.g.,
CASSESE, infra note 12, at 90-99.
12
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/94, ¶¶ 3, 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/94
(Dec. 20, 1993) (“Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the
Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and
colonial domination to self-determination, independence and
sovereignty…”). See also, G.A. Res. 58/163, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/163 (Mar. 4, 2004); G.A. Res. 55/85, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/85 (Feb. 28, 2001); G.A. Res. 41/100, at 162, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/100 (Dec. 4, 1986); G.A. Res. 38/16, at 184, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/38/16 (Nov. 22, 1983); G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX), at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/3236 (Nov. 5, 1974); See also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 92
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
8

exploitation. In short, the Palestinians continuously make
up part of the former category of colonial territories.
What Professor Quigley largely ignores is that the
right to secessionist self-determination by colonial
territories is still plagued by genuine uncertainties in public
international law.13 Quigley admittedly takes the rather
incomplete factual approbation of the 1988 Palestinian UDI
by a large number of states as an indication that these states
regard Palestine as a state.14 Professor Quigley explains
that there are precedents of recognition of statehood being
extended on the basis of self-determination by aspirant
governments before the aspirant government claims
effective control. In other instances, he adds that this form
of early recognition envisages the attainment of effective
control within a foreseeable future.15
Different than what Quigley assumes for the
Palestinian case in point, there simply is no binding right of
secession under public international law.16 Moreover, no
preliminary agreements on the criteria have taken place that
might be used in the future to determine when secession
13

See e.g., Milena Sterio, On the Right to External SelfDetermination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and the Great Powers' Rule,
19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 145-46 (2010); Vidmar, infra note 31, at 6;
Report Presented by the Council of the League by the Commission of
Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations
Council Doc. B7 (1921); Badinter Commission, supra note 7, at
1497-99.
14
Quigley, supra note 1, at 752.
15
Id. at 753 (referring to D.A. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Selfdetermination (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 414415).
16
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2006).
9

should be supported.17 In continuation, Professor Quigley's
doctrinal deficiency over Palestinian secession is further
challenged by state practice upholding how selfdetermination arises under one of three legal theories of
secession, namely bilateral, unilateral (remedial), or de
facto.18
The first type of secession that regrettably eludes
Quigley's analysis of Palestinian statehood already since
1988−and possibly since 1948−is based on bilateral
agreement between the metropolitan state and the
dependent territory.19 Two conditions justify bilateral
secession: A “clear expression of democratic will” by
seceding peoples and the presence of negotiations between
the secessionists and the parent country.20 The second
condition is the presence of negotiations between the

17

See Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the
Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 777 (1998).
18
See e.g., CASSESE, supra note 12; CRAWFORD, supra note 16;
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELFDETERMINATION THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS
(Univ. of Pa. Press, 2nd ed. 1996); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELFDETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE THE NEW DOCTRINE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Martinus Nihoff Publishers, 1982); A. RIGO
SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
A STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (A.W. Sijthoff Int’l Publ’g
Co., 1973).
19
James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation
to Unilateral Secession, Report to the Government of Canada
concerning unilateral secession by Quebec (1997), reprinted in
ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 31 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2000) [hereinafter, Crawford, State Practice Report],
para. 17.
20
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 264-65
(Can.).
10

secessionists and the parent country.21 In this way and
dissimilar to the Palestinian case, the parent country grants
independence in response to democratic pressure, thereby
justifying the secession.
Professor Quigley’s assertion deemphasizes the fact
that a lack of bilateral secession will result in only two
alternative means of unilateral secession: winning a war of
independence or negotiated independence.
The first
method is by traditional means of winning a war of
independence, which Palestine has not done. Two rather
successful examples for the alternative model are
Bangladesh22 in the early 1970s backed by India's foreign
military assistance, and Chechnya to a limited degree
during the 1990s.23
The second method is to negotiate independence
provided that the central government, in this case Israel,
agrees to engage in negotiations.24 Surely, an archetypical
central government, like Israel's is not obliged by
international law to comply.25
Especially after the adoption of the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
21

Id. at 265-66.
See S.C. Res. 307, U.N. Doc. S/Res/307 (Dec. 21, 1971); see also
India-Pakistan, Simla Agreement on Bilateral Relations and
Statement on its Implementation, 3 July 1972, 11 ILM 954 (1971);
see also VP Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The
Tragic Tale of Two Cities – Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca
(East Pakistan) 66 AJIL, 321 (1972) (on Bangladesh).
23
Diana Draganova, Chechnya’s Right of Secession under Russian
Constitutional Law, 3(2) CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 571 (2004).
24
Crawford, State Practice Report, supra note 19, para. 17.
25
Id.
22

11

Peoples of 1960, the United Nations General Assembly
urged that rapid decisions be made as to the selfgovernment or independence of colonial territories, such as
with the Palestinian case. Yet, there is only one exception
of the United Nations advocating or supporting unilateral
rights of secession. The exceptional practice – rather
irrelevant to the Palestinian case - has been for non-selfgoverning territories, where self-determination was
effectively opposed by the colonial power. This became
state practice in the case of the Portuguese African
territories namely in Angola, Mozambique, and GuineaBissau.26 In the vast majority of cases, self-government or
independence was always been achieved peacefully and by
agreement with the administering authority.27
State
practice depicts that nearly a hundred territories designated
as colonial under Chapters XI and XII have become
independent, and have been admitted to the United
Nations.28
Unlike with the Israeli government, when the parent
state is unwilling to negotiate the outcome is less clear.29
As illustrated with the Palestinian UDI of 1988, there
remain two additional non-binding types of secessionist
self-determination which Professor Quigley fails to qualify
26

Id.
Id.
28
Id., para. 19. (citing note 21 listing all the countries admitted to
the United Nations).
29
See Milena Sterio, supra note 13, at 145-46; Jure Vidmar,
International Legal Responses to Kosovo's Declaration of
Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 809 (2009); Report
Presented by the Council of the League by the Commission of
Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, supra note 13; Badinter
Commission, supra note 7, at 1497-99.
27

12

adequately. The first of two is remedial secessionist selfdetermination. It corresponds to the varying degrees of
oppression inflicted upon a particular group by its
governing state, whereby public international law may
recognize secession as the ultimate remedy.30
The Aaland Islands case in 192131 articulated the
requirements for justifiable secession when the parent state,
such as Israel in our case, may oppose it, assuming those
wishing to secede are legally considered “a people”, such
as the Palestinians.32 Yet, state practice herein adds two
additional requirements, which neither Professor Quigley
nor the Palestinians have elaborated or established. The
first additional requirement is that the secessionist people,
such as the Palestinians, were subject to very serious
violations of human rights at the hands of the parent state.
The second additional requirement is that absolutely no
30

See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 31, para. 82 (July 22) (The Court finds that the
declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February
2008 did not violate international law); see also LEE C. BUCHHEIT,
40 SECESSION 222 (1978); Vidmar, supra note 29, at 814-18; Cf.
ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELFDETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
351-53 (2004).
31
See Report Presented by the Council of the League by the
Commission of Rapporteurs, supra note 13, at 21. (League of
Nations denying the right of the people in a collection of these
islands living historically under Finnish control to have right to
secede from Finland and be annexed by Sweden).
32
The definition of “people” is somewhat ambiguous. See Vidmar,
supra note 29, at 810-12. But see Christopher J. Borgen, The
Language of the Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and
the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South
Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (2009).
13

other remedies were available to them.33 Recently, the
Supreme Court of Canada noticeably applied an equivalent
standard in its decision on the final denial of secession of
the Province of Quebec in 1998.34 To be sure, the
interpretation given to these requirements is strict and
certainly was not upheld in the present Palestinian case. In
the background of this are the ongoing bilateral Oslo
Interim Accords setting, continuously backed by the
Quartet forum incorporating the United Nations, The
United States, the Russian Federation and the European
Union.
The second comparable non-binding type of
secession is de facto secession, which is either remedial or
non-remedial.
In such cases, a population secedes
unilaterally, thereby leaving the international community as
arbiter of its ultimate success, namely its recognition by
other states.35 Both remedial and de facto unilateral
33

See Borgen, supra note 32, at 8.
Reference re Succession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 281, 28486 (Can.) (describing the threefold requirements for secession: that
the seceding group are a “people,” “governed as part of a colony, or
subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation,” and when
it is deprived of “the meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination”).
35
Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 284-86. To
illustrate, in the latest case of Chechnya's de facto secession, the
Russian Federation has implicitly recognized de facto secession of
the former by concluding the Treaty on Peace and the Principles of
Interrelations with the Chechen Republican of Ichkeria in 1997. See
Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian
Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria, May 12, 1997,
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus2.pdf.
See generally Draganova, supra note 23, at 572-537, 583-87
(inquiring whether “a constituent part of a State has the right to
external self-determination.”).
34
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secessions may uphold a joint mechanism, questionably
practiced through the 1988 Palestinian UDI. In both forms
of secessionist self-determination, a UDI is used to refer to
the unilateral act by which a group declares that it is
seceding to form a new state. Yet, different than as
perceived by Quigley, although usually declaratory in form,
a UDI is not a self-executing act and may not lead
necessarily to self-governance, sovereignty, or statehood.36
The main obscurity with Quigley’s analysis is that the
independence of a state is established by both territorial
control and recognition of statehood by other states and the
parent state itself. That is, especially recognition by the
state on whose territory the secession is occurring, namely
the parent state being Israel. An interrelated analytical
framework offered
by Professors
Oppenheim,37
Crawford,38 Shaw,39 and others,40 reiterated the criterion of
36

See Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 16, at 123. But see Quigley, Palestine is a State, supra
note 1, at 751-53 (arguing Palestine’s statehood is a “matter of fact”
and that recognition by other countries is not a pre-requisite to
achieving statehood; recognition merely indicates acceptance). See
also discussion Infra Part II.A. (explaining that for decades Palestine
has lacked sovereignty as Israel has exercised control over and held
possession of the area in which Palestine allegedly self-governs).
37
L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 114-15
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1947) (listing the four preconditions
of statehood: a people, a territory, a government, and sovereignty).
38
See Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 16, at 447 (explaining that even the exercise of external
self-determination need not result in independence, “and where
serious issues remain to be resolved about the constitution and
boundaries of the putative State… statehood should not be regarded
as existing already, as it were, by operation of law").
39
See also Malcolm N. Shaw, The Article 12(3) Declaration of the
Palestinian Authority, the International Criminal Court and
International Law, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 301, 305 (2011).
15

state independence. The latter alternative criterion refers to
effective sovereignty through self-governance as a central
prerequisite for statehood. Even in cases where belligerent
occupation is present, such as in Israel, self-governance is
required to obtain statehood.41 Thus, it is required that a
declaration of independence be present, yet it is not a
satisfactory condition for unilateral secession, as is the case
with Palestine”.42
Moreover, decolonization state practice clearly
shows that only where there has been international
legitimization by the United Nations may the operation of
the secessionist self-determination principle be altered,
40

See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (1928)
(statement by Arb. Huber on “…sovereignty in its relation to
territory”); see also Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d
274, 288 (1st Cir. 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: PERSONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 201 note 5
(A.L.I. 1987) (“Some writers add independence to the criteria
required for statehood. Compare the Austro-German Customs Union
case ... in which the Court advised that a proposed customs union
violated Austria's obligation under the Treaty of St. Germain to
retain its independence.”).
41
See Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 16, at 447. See J. Crawford, The Creation of Palestine:
Too Much Too Soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 307, 309 (1990). See also
Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at Part II.B.2 (discussing the
independence criterion concerning the Palestinian statehood
question). But see Memorandum from John Quigley on the
Recognition of Palestinian Statehood 1 (May 20, 2010) (on file with
author) (arguing that a state may be created even in the absence of
independence or without independence have “materialized” into
self-governance thereby implicitly including territories subject to
competing title claims); Michael Kearney, Palestine and the
International Criminal Court: Asking the Right Question, UCLA
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L CRIM. L. ONLINE FORUM,
http://uclalawforum.com/gaza#Kearney (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
42
See Crawford supra note 16, at 123.
16

mostly by means of border modifications. However, this
would be dependent upon an internationally accepted threat
to peace and security, which is dissimilar to our case in
point. This rationale led the United Nations Security
Council to repeatedly call for a bilateral negotiated peace
agreement instead.43
Lastly, Professor Quigley's analytical framework
falls short on an additional fundamental aspect concerning
the issues of territorial integrity over border disputes, which
is derived from the secessionist principle.44 Once groups
are allowed to exercise self-determination through
secession, border disputes may prove more contentious
than secession. This grim scenario has eluded Quigley's
analysis completely, whereby his assumption seems to
remain that Palestinian self-declaration unfolds their
complete sovereignty over disputed parts of the occupied
territories, such as the holy places in East Jerusalem, the
strategically vital Jordan Valley, or the few settlement
blocs. Part II.B.2 of this article will examine that Israel
argues for a competing title and a possibly negotiated land
swap, backed by its interpretation of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
To illustrate how crucially important border
disputes are within the overall secessionist selfdetermination, one is reminded that the blood-spattered
43

See G.A. Res. 1746 (XVI(, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/1746 (June27,
1962); Malcolm N. Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of
Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 67 BRIT. J. INT’L. L. 75, 148 (1996). See
discussion infra Part II.B.2.
44
See infra Part II.A for a detailed depiction of these disputed
territories.
17

Yugoslav wars in the 1990s were related mostly to borders
issues. The reason for that has been possibly similar to the
present Palestinian one, whereby a version of the Uti
Possidetis Juris (UPJ) doctrine was upheld in creating
international borders while transforming existing internal
ones of the various Yugoslav republics regardless of the
ethnic groups' conflicts therein.45 In 1991 to resolve
problems in the Balkans, 46 the Badinter Commission
utilized the UPJ doctrine to manage the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. 47
In the Palestinian case, Professor Quigley only
implicitly refers to equivalent borders disputes over
competing titles by the Israelis and Palestinians. Instead,
he incorporates at least all of the occupied West Bank and
East Jerusalem wholly within a Palestinian state. Indeed,
the principle of UPJ is a critical doctrine that offers a very
strong presumption that a colony or federal or other distinct
administrative unit, such as the Palestinian Authority (PA),
will come to independence within the borders that it had in
the period immediately prior to independence.48 There are
45

See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565
(Dec. 22), for a broader discussion of Uti Possidetis Juris.
46
See generally Richard Falk, Self-Determination under
International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the
Incoherence of Experience, in THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION, AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD 31, 52 (Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, ed. 2002).
47
See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565
(Dec. 22), for a broader discussion of Badinter Commission, supra
note 7, at 1498 (interpreted the Uti Possidetis Juris. doctrine in the
Yugoslav opinion broadly, to include instances of selfdetermination).
48
Tomas Bartoš, Uti Possidetis: Quo Vadis?, 18 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L
L. 37, 39-40 (1997); Shaw, supra note 43, at 148. See also
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two exceptions to this doctrine that Professor Quigley again
never discusses. This article is an analysis of the two
exceptions to the UPJ doctrine that Professor Quigley did
not address.
Part II.A defines the Israeli-Palestinian territorial
dispute over segments of the occupied West Bank and East
Jerusalem. In so doing, it questions Professor Quigley's
assertion that Palestinians sufficiently self-govern the
occupied territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem
while proclaiming statehood over the entire territory. This
article is a specific response to Quigley’s assertion of
implied adherence to Palestinian statehood. Furthermore, it
identifies the two primary exceptions to the territorial
integrity principle of the UPJ doctrine and explains why
neither exception has been successfully established by
Palestine. The first exception, discussed in Part II.B,
upholds that parties themselves may agree to alter the UPJ
rule, both during the process of acquisition of independence
and afterwards, such as possibly within the Oslo Interim
Accords.49

Continental Shelf (Tunis v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 65-66 (Feb. 24)
(discussing the doctrine’s historical application in settling
decolonization issues in America and Africa). Badinter
Commission, supra note 7, at 1500. See Frontier Dispute, 1986
I.C.J. at 566 (explaining that the fundamental aim of the doctrine of
uti possidetis juris is to underline the principle of stability of state
boundaries, but it also provides the new state with territorial
legitimization).
49
Shaw, supra note 43, at 141; G.A. Res. 1608 (XV), ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. A/1608 (Apr. 21, 1961). Beagle Channel Arbitration (Arg. v.
Chile), 17 I.L.M. 632 (1977); Badinter Commission, supra note 7, at
1498. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v.
Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 408 (Sept. 11).
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The second exception discussed in Part II.C, may
uphold the need for acceptance of this bilateral agreement
by the United Nations.50 Both, as said, are presently highly
debatable in considering Professor Quigley's territorial
criteria altogether.

II. The Territorial Integrity Intricacy
A. Defining Palestinian Disputed Self Governance
Professor Quigley underplays the mere fact that the
territory under Palestinian self-governance corresponds to a
minor segment of the occupied territories. Moreover,
Quigley ignores Israel's competing titles backed by its own
governance over most territories therein.51 Arguably,
although Israel's competing titles do not incorporate most
of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they, nevertheless,
bring into question possible Palestinian independence over
the West Bank and East Jerusalem as long as Israel is
governing those areas.
Put differently, if Palestinian statehood is declared
over the entire occupied territory, then Israel's competing
titles over sections of the West Bank and possibly East
Jerusalem, coupled with Israeli governance over the region
as a whole may withstand Palestinian independence over
the rest of the region in which Israel has no competing title.
Professor Quigley's analysis is, regrettably, overly
50

Shaw, supra note 43, at 141.
See Crawford, The Creation of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon,
supra note 41, at 309 (upholding that this requirement incorporates
effective governance over territory that otherwise could be regarded
as competed in title by a different party, and thus lacking the criteria
of independence over such disputed territories).
51
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generalized concerning the diminutive Palestinian selfgovernance of these territories, as explained below.
By and large, the type of governance adopted by
occupying-Israel in the West Bank following the 1967 Six
Day War was military government subject to the
international law of occupation.52 A separate military
administration was established basing itself on the law in
force immediately prior to the occupation.53 In doing so,
Israel noticeably adhered to Jordan's existing laws,
notwithstanding Israel’s nonrecognition of the Jordanian
pre-1967 annexation of the West Bank.54
What is important to date, however, is that
following the Oslo I Interim Accord of 1995, and
growingly until the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of
1999, Israeli military governance over the West Bank left
the Palestinians with effective self-governance only over
17.2% of the West Bank known as Area A, where
Palestinians assumed full civil and internal security

52

Moshe Drori, The Legal System of Judea and Samaria: A Review
of the Previous Decade with a Glance at the Future, 8 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 144, 146-47 (1996) (for more on the legal system in the
West Bank during the first decade).
53
See PROCLAMATION NO. 2, PROCLAMATION REGARDING
REGULATION OF ADMINISTRATION AND LAW, issued by Commander
of IDF Forces in the West Bank Region (June 7, 1967) available at
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/mil03.
54
See Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel
and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 934, 944-45
(2002) (citing H.C. 61/80, Ha'etzni v. State of Israel, 34 (3) P.D. 595
[1980] (Isr.) (upholding the rationale of maintain public order).
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responsibilities.55 In addition, the Palestinians were left
with effective self-governance conceivably in the part of
Area B in which the Palestinians assumed civil control,
leaving security responsibility in the hands of the Israeli
army, with additional 23.8% of the overall occupied West
Bank.56 The main point herein, which has been flatly
ignored by Quigley, is that, as officially admitted by the
Palestinian Authority itself, Area C, which is comprised of
the majority of the West Bank (about 59%) remains
exclusively under Israeli military government control,
subject to the international law of occupation, instead of a
Palestinian self-governing alternative.57
In an archetypical, national Development Plan
recently submitted by the Palestinian National Authority
(PNA) to the World Bank, a detailed depiction by the
Palestinians of what is titled "Lack of Sovereignty"
illustrates a minority scale of 17.2% of full control by the
PNA in the West Bank altogether.58
Moreover, and much to the Palestinians’ dismay,
the PNA is also, admittedly, lacking control over external
borders.59
PNA does not possess control over the
movement and access of people, goods, and services within

55

See Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010,
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY 15-16 available at
http://www.jmcc.org/documents/development_plan.pdf.
56
Id.
57
Id. (admitting that in Area C Israel presently retains full control of
civil and security matters).
58
Id. (depicting a continuous albeit slow growth in the size of Area
A).
59
Id. at 16.
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and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip,60 nor has
jurisdiction over natural resources, airspace and the sea.61
The treatment of the occupied eastern part of
Jerusalem similarly foretells the lack of any Palestinian
self-governance. Soon after the Six Day War, on June 28,
1967, the Israeli Government extended Israeli “law,
jurisdiction[,] and administration” by incorporating this
area within the existing Israeli municipality of the western
part of the city.62 To the international community this act
was explained not as an annexation but as an administrative
measure, aimed both at extending the same municipal
services to all residents of the now-single municipal area
and at ensuring the protection of the Holy Places through
Israeli laws.63
In the enactment in 1980 of Basic Law, Jerusalem
was named the Capital of Israel and Israel asserted that a
“[u]nified Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.” Surely, this
Act did not create any change in the internal legal situation
in East Jerusalem, but did express unequivocally Israel’s
claim to the right to exercise its sovereignty over the area.64
60

Id.
Id.
62
See LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCE (Amendment No. 1),
Knesset (June 27, 1967) available at
www.geocities.com/savepalestinenow/israellaws/fulltext/lawandadm
inistrat670627.htm.
63
Abu Salakh v. Minister of the Interior, 37(2) P.D. 718 [1983] (Isr.)
(approving Justice Cohen’s opinion in Ruweidi v. Military Court of
Hebron, 24(ii) P.D. 419 [1970] (Isr)). Basic Law: Jerusalem the
Capital of Israel, 5740, 34 LSI 209, ¶ 1.
64
Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, 5740, 34 LSI 209, ¶ 1;
Ne'emaney Har-Habait v. Attorney General, 47(5) P.D. 221 [1994
(Isr.); See S.C. Res. 252, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Dec. S/RES/252 (May 21,
61
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What matters herein is that East Jerusalem continuously
remained in Israeli control instead of Palestinian.
To conclude, with less than a fifth of territories over
which the Palestinians practice self governance in the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem (excluding the separately
Hamas-governed Gaza Strip), and with some segments over
which Israel has competing titles; it is highly questionable
whether the Palestinians present claim for statehood
withstands Israel's present territorial integrity. This is
based on a twofold set of arguments which further weaken
Quigley's analysis of Palestinian statehood altogether,
referring to arguable Palestinian violations of United
Nations resolutions as well as the violation of United
Nations resolutions as well the violation of the bilateral
Oslo Interim Agreement.

B. First Disintegration: Violation of United Nations
Resolutions
The first of two sets of arguments refer to the

1967); S.C. Res. 267, ¶¶ 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/267 (July 3, 1969);
S.C. Res. 298, ¶¶ 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971); S.C.
Res. 446, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979). S.C. Res.
476, ¶¶ 1-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/476 (June 30, 1980); G.A. Res. 2253
(ES-V), ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES 2253 (Jul. 4, 1967); G.A. Res.
2254 (ES-V), ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES 2254 (Jul. 4, 1967); G.A.
Res. 31/106, ¶¶ 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/106A (Dec. 16, 1967);
G.A. Res. 33/113, U.N. Doc. A/RES/22/113 (Dec. 18, 1978); Per
the condemnation of the 1980 Basic Law, see also S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶
1-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980); G.A. Res. 36/120, ¶¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/120E (Dec. 10, 1981); G.A. Res. 37/123, ¶¶
1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/123C (Dec. 16, 1982); G.A. Res. 39/146,
¶¶ 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/146C (Dec. 14, 1984).
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complex and rather contradictory adherence by the
Palestinians to the United Nations resolutions, which the
Palestinians have operated under in order to establish
statehood. The reservations to Quigley's analysis concerns
the first exception to the UPJ doctrine; a state practice of a
need for acceptance of any deviation from the doctrine by
the United Nations.65 Additional support is found in the
European Guidelines on Recognition of New States in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, adopted by the
European Community and its Member States on December
16, 1991. These provided for a common policy on
recognition of states emerging from the former Yugoslavia
and former USSR in particular, which required inter alia
“respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only
be changed by peaceful means and by common
agreement”.66 Yet the Palestinian PNA's narration of both
its 1988 and 2011 UDI’s initiatives are possibly
inconsistent.
In particular, the present analysis refers to a set of
specialized and late United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, 242, 338, and 1850, which were ignored at
least in part by the Palestinians. However relevant
adherence to Israeli competing land titles on sections of the
West Bank possibly proves East Jerusalem exists. These
considerations, presently missing from Quigley's analysis,
are threefold. First, they refer to the inconsistent Palestinian
2011 United Nations application for membership, which
took place in September 2011, manifesting a rather

65
66

Supra note 49.
ILM supra note 49, at 1509 (emphasis added).
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challenging Palestinian territorial criterion narration.
Secondly, this part offers a detailed critique of Quigley's
analysis of United Nations Resolutions concerning the
territorial aspect, with special emphasis on Security
Council resolutions 242, 338 and 1850. Lastly, this part
offers a third group of reservations per Quigley's analysis,
while considering the probable lack of good faith practiced
by the Palestinians in their treatment of these seminal
United Nations Security Council resolutions.

1. The Inconsistent 2011 Palestinian United Nations
Application
To begin, the first of three sets of argument refers to
the complex and rather contradictory adherence by the
Palestinians to United Nations resolutions, through which
the Palestinians have operated to establish full territorial
rights. At the outset, the Palestinian position was reiterated
in a historical speech by Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas. The speech by President Abbas was addressed to
the United Nations General Assembly on, September 23,
2011. This was soon after submitting the official
application by Palestine for United Nations membership to
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. In his
speech, President Abbas reiterated the will of the
Palestinian people for statehood on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, in their entirety, with East Jerusalem as its
capital.67 President Abbas indirectly referred to the twostate solution model in support of a “full 1967 borders”
67

See Full Transcript of Abbas Speech at UN General Assembly,
Haaretz (September 23, 2011), available at
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-ofabbas-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386385.
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proposition.68 He presumably backed this position through
a letter annexed to the application dated September 23,
2011, from the President of Palestine to the SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon. The letter effectively refers to a
present-day consensus within international law to the 1967
borders model.69
Yet, per the issue at stake, namely Israel's
competing title over strategic segments of the territories
and the remaining issue of limited Palestinian selfgovernance over the 1967 occupied territories, that position
remains highly questionable.
Thus, regrettably, the
Palestinian President's speech and supportive letter is
inconsistent with the Palestinian Authority's application for
United Nations membership that followed.70 In contrast to
the Presidential speech and letter, the formal Palestinian
application is based on two constituting documents referred
to therein. Both documents further depict fundamental
inconsistency with the overarching Palestinian avoidance of
Israel’s competing territorial claims for title. The first
document is the General Assembly's Resolution 181(II)
dated November 29, 1947, standing for the United Nations
Partition Plan for Palestine.71 The second document
68

The Official Palestinian Application, supra note 3, at 2.
Id.
70
The Official Palestinian Application, supra note 3; Rabbie Sabel,
The Palestinians and the Application for Admittance as State: Where
is the State? 184 Inns Insight, October 2, 2011, The Institute for
National Security Studies at Tel-Aviv University, available at
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1317728523.pdf.
71
The Resolution served as a recommendation for partition by
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 to
replace the British Mandate for Palestine with "Independent Arab
and Jewish States." It further called for a "Special International
Regime for the City of Jerusalem" administered by the United
69
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referred to in the aforementioned Palestinian application is
the Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November
15, 1988.72
Officially, the Palestinians are allowed to refrain
from offering exact national borders with their application
of admittance as members with the United Nations. Yet the
two documents, upon which their Palestinian application is
based, systematically ignore any adherence to the abovementioned 1967 borders, to the remaining criterion of
effective self-governance, and to lack of competing title by
another state given the latter's claim for territorial
integrity.73
The first of two documents, namely the United
Nations General Assembly Partition Plan Resolution
181(II) recommended a distinct border model, whereby the
Arab state to be established within the former British
mandate borders of Palestine would engulf any possible
Israeli or other claim for even the 1967 borders to begin
with.
In particular, the Partition Plan Resolution
historically offered much of present day Israel to be
considered part of the Arab state.
Such is the
recommendation that the latter incorporates present-day
Israel's Galilee region almost in its entirety to the
metropolitan area of the city of Be'er Sheva in Israel's
southern Negev region. This is while extracting the entire
Nations. U.N. G.A. Res. 181(II) at 133 (emphasis added). See also
Future Government of Palestine, available at
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061
d253. [hereinafter the Partition Plan].
72
See Palestine National Council: Declaration of Independence (15
November 1988), in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER at 542-46 (Walter
Laqueur & Barry Rubin, eds., 5th ed. 1995).
73
Sabel, supra note 70, at 1-2.
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city of Jerusalem from Israeli and Arab sovereignty
towards a "Special International Regime for the City of
Jerusalem".74
Equally relevant, adherence to the Partition Plan
with the Palestinian application request further failed to
mention the fact that like with all Arab states at the time
when the Partition Plan was recommended, no Palestinian
leadership or the Palestinian Authority ever acknowledged
the borders offered in the Partition Plan. Nor did the
Palestinians offer recognition of it or willingness to act
accordingly. The record by the Palestinians themselves was
to the contrary. Thus, on February 16, 1948, the United
Nations Palestine Commission reported to the Security
Council: “[p]owerful Arab interests, both inside and outside
Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General
Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by
force the settlement envisaged therein.”75 Palestinian
leadership, as well as neighboring Arab states historically
left the newly established State of Israel as a sole regional
supportive party to the Partition Plan. Soon after, they
launched a war of aggression against it in the hope to
nullify the Plan and defeat the nascent State of Israel
altogether.76 Israel was not admitted conditionally or
74

The Partition Plan, supra note 71, at 133.
U.N. Palestine Comm’n First Special Report to the Security
Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine, U.N. SCOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.21/9 at 3 (Feb. 16, 1948).
76
See Crawford, supra note 16, at 313. On the approach by Arab
states and the Palestinian leadership towards the Partition Plan in the
eve of the establishment of the State of Israel is, stands a terrifying
threat of genocide made by the first Secretary-General of the Arab
League Azzam Pasha who declared "[t]his will be a war of
extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of
like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." BENNY MORRIS,
RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS 218-19 (1999). But see Alexander H. Joffe &
Asaf Romirowsky, A Tale of Two Galloways: Notes on the Early
75
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unconditionally to the United Nations based on the
Partition Resolution or upon its recommended borders.77
Lastly, the 1949 Armistice Agreements entered into
force by Israel and its Arab neighbors, establishing the
Armistice Demarcation Lines, clearly stated that these lines
“are without prejudice to future territorial settlements or
boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.”
Accordingly, they cannot be accepted or declared to be the
international boundaries of a Palestinian state in reliance on
the Partition Plan or post-1948 war derivatives thereof.
That is while incorporating the wordings of pivotal Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which are discussed
hereinafter78 as well as in the Interim Israeli-Palestinian
Oslo Accords.79
The second document upon which the Palestinian
application is inconsistently based, vis-à-vis the issue of the
two parties’ competing territorial titles, is the unilateral
Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November 15,
1988.80 A careful read of the 1988 Declaration of
Independence portrays what has been an intentional
Palestinian avoidance of any affirmation of its requested
History of UNRWA and Zionist Historiography, 46 MIDDLE
EASTERN STUDIES (2010) 655, 671 (discussing the doubtful
historical observation concerning the exact quote by Pasha).
77
See Crawford, supra note 16, at 442.
78
Even the abovementioned Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 in continuation, did not specify the boundaries of Israel or
endorse the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Lines as permanent
borders. See, S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967);
S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973).
79
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Isr.-PLO, art. I, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525
[hereinafter Oslo I], (recognizing Resolutions 242 and 338 will be
implemented during negotiations of permanent status).
80
See, Palestine National Council: Declaration of Independence,
supra note 72.
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borders, permanent or temporary alike. In its place, the
Declaration vaguely refers to “on our Palestinian territory”
implying the inclusion of the whole of Israel's territory,
whilst mentioning Jerusalem at large (Al-Quds AshSharif).81
And so, dissimilar with the Palestinian
presidential speech and annexed letter to the United
Nations Secretary General, the 1988 declaration offers a
much broader and controversial Palestinian territorial title
claim altogether.
Moreover, the 1988 unilateral Declaration of
Independence offers further inconsistency given the map of
the “Palestinian State” offered by the Palestine National
Authority (PNA) at the time of the Declaration
proceedings. Such a map offers even further competing
claims to territory as it not only integrates the entirety of
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the whole of Israel; but
in fact also parts of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.82
Given these troublesome territorial title claim
inconsistencies with the 1967 two-state solution model, it is
of no surprise that Israel is not included on the map of the
Middle East on the official web site of the Palestine
Authority.83 Instead, the entire land of Israel is labeled
Palestine.84
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Id. at 356.
Mr. Khalil Tufakji, Head of the Palestinian Geographical Maps
Department at Jerusalem's Arab Research Society was
commissioned to produce the map. See PALESTINE NET PORTAL,
http://www.palestine-net.com/geography/gifs/palmap.giv.
83
Id.
84
Similarly, in Palestinian Authority's geography page, Palestine is
described as encompassing Israel and the occupied territories.
See PALESTINE: GEOGRAPHY,
http://www.palestinenet.com/geography/ (defining Palestine as
"currently under occupation...located on the East Coast of the
Mediterranean Seas, West of Jordan and to the South of
82
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2. Evasion of United Nations Security Council
resolutions
There is a second set of arguments that concerns
incomplete Palestinian title claims per their larger
statehood claim (again ignoring Israel's competing titles
thereof). It refers to a set of specialized and late United
Nations Security Council Resolutions (Resolutions 242,
338, and 1850) that were simply ignored, at least partly, by
the Palestinians whereby relevant adherence to Israeli
competing land titles can be possibly upheld. It concerns
the conflict of law between the Partition Plan Resolution
181(II) on the one hand, and the prevailing Security
Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850 on the other;
thereby possibly upholding Israel's competing title claims
over Palestinian ones.
The term “occupied territories” originally derived
from Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which ended
the Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and its
neighboring Arab states, upon the occupation of present
day competing title territories.85 Among other things, this
Resolution “[a]ffirm[ed] that the fulfillment of Charter
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East which should include the . . .
[w]ithdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict.”86 Upon its adoption,
Resolution 242 failed to achieve consensus about whether
Israel could maintain any land title over some of the West

Lebanon. The territory of Palestine covers around 10,435 square
miles...").
85
S.C. Res. 242, supra note 78, § 1(i).
86
Id. § 1.
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Bank and possibly occupied East Jerusalem.87
In
continuation, Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on
October 22, 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, called upon
all parties concerned (soon after the cease-fire between
them) to start immediately “the implementation of Security
Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts.”88
A prime illustration of the incomplete analysis
presented by Quigley, concerning the Palestinian territorial
claims, concerns the area of the Jordan Valley running
across the eastern border between Israel and Jordan. In
fact, the vast majority of the Jordan Valley is to date selfgoverned by Israel as it falls within Area C under the Oslo
Accords.89 The primary formal justification by consecutive
Israeli governments has seen the Jordan Valley as a

87

See Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 93. See also Documents
537-41 (Nov. 21, 1967), in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1964-1968 VOLUME XIX, ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS AND WAR,
1967 (Harriet D. Schwar & Edward C. Keefer eds., 2004); Eugene
Rostow, The Intent of UNSC Resolution 242, in UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242: THE BUILDING BLOCK OF PEACEMAKING
5, 15 (1993) (narrating the interpretation in support of Israel’s right
for territorial ‘security boundaries’ within the West Bank and
possibly East Jerusalem).
But see Nabil Elaraby, Legal
Interpretations of UNSC 242, in UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242: THE BUILDING BLOCK OF PEACEMAKING 35, 3544; Glenn E. Perry, Security Council Resolution 242: The
Withdrawal Clause, 31 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 413, 415
(Autumn 1977).
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military bases, natural reserves and numerous settlements) is
94.37%. See MA'AN DEVELOPMENT CENTER & JORDAN VALLEY
POPULAR COMMITTEES, EYE ON THE JORDAN VALLEY 3 (2010).
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security buffer against an eastern Arab invasion.90 That is,
within the confines of the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, Israel's vital need for "secure and
recognized” boundaries in the region upon achieving a
comprehensive peace agreement with its Arab
neighbours.91 As a consequence, the Jordan Valley is
surrounded with an electronic fence running the length of
the eastern border. The fence faces Jordan, based on past
experience of three separate armed attacks or threats
thereof by joint Arab armies from that front against the
State of Israel.92 To be sure, the Palestinians envision the
Jordan Valley as a core part of a future Palestinian state.
Israel’s justification for its competing titles, flatly
90

See Lee Cahaner et al., Future of the Jordan Valley – Keeping It
under Israeli Sovereignty – Pro and Con (Reuven Chaikin Chair in
Geostrategy, University of Haifa, February 2006), available at
http://geo.haifa.ac.il/~chstrategy/publications/books/yarden/yarden.pdf (in Hebrew), at 20;
Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, IDF Must Remain in Jordan Valley, Vows
Netanyahu, ARUTZ SHEVA (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:41 AM),
http://www.Israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/142772#.Txb
HvaVa5Vk (for the Israeli claim). Contra Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, PA
Rejects Compromise on Jordan Valley Sovereignty, ARUTZ SHEVA,
(Mar. 9, 2011, 11:57 AM)
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/142773#.Txb
HK6Va5Vk (for the Palestinian rejection of the Israeli claim
thereof).
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Id.
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Id. at 26 (describing the three separate Arab armed attacks and
threats thereof against Israel directed from the eastern Jordan Valley
during: 1) The War of Independence of 1948, following the joint
attack by the armies of Syria, Iraq and Jordan over Israel; 2) The Six
Day War of 1967 when Jordan attacked Israel backed by Iraqi army
based in Jordan; 3) The Yom Kippur War of 1973 when the armies
of Jordan and Iraq mobilized for attack in the eastern Jordan Valley
against Israel's northern defensive campaign against Syrian surprise
attack over Israel).
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ignored by Professor Quigley's analysis, was that
Resolution 242, backed by Resolution 338, called on Israel
to withdraw from “territory,” decidedly not “all territory.”
The borders of such a withdrawal were surely meant to
reflect both Palestinian and Israeli right to live in “secure
and recognized” boundaries in the region, while
considering possible land concessions possibly in favour of
Israel, as is the case concerning the Jordan Valley or
segments thereof.93
Surely the provision on the
establishment of “secure and recognized boundaries” would
have been meaningless had there been an obligation upon
Israel to withdraw from all the territories, regardless of a
comprehensive peace agreement between the belligerent
parties.94 Professor Quigley regrettably ignores these
territorial implications. Instead, he mistakenly suggests
that Israel simply has not claimed for competing titles, with
the possible exception of East Jerusalem or parts thereof.95
There is much evidence that critically questions Quigley's
assertion, proving Israel claimed competing titles and a
possibly negotiated land swap. Thus, Israel has evidently
claimed title and a possibly negotiated land swap of the
Jordan Valley96 and major settlement blocs bordering
Israel.97 Israel similarly claimed title of East Jerusalem,
93

Id. at 20.
See Ruth Lapidoth, Resolution 242 at 25, 26 ISR. L. R. 295, 310
(1992).
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Quigley, supra note 1, at 758.
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See Cahaner, supra note 90, at 20; Gedalyahu, supra note 90 (for
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claim).
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See Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States,
to Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel
(April 14, 2004), available at
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including the holy places therein, as Quigley possibly
admits himself. 98
In balance, flexibility on borders offered within
Resolution 242 arguably cannot be applied to any pre-1967
borders model. The reason for the inapplicability being
that any such early borderlines were neither secured nor
recognized. Both the relevant Arab states, as well as the
United Nations, seemed to have adhered in part to this
Israeli stand. A case in point is the systematic wordings of
the ambassadors of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the
preliminary debates before the Security Council on May
1967, whereby they emphasized the fact that these “were
no borders” and these were only “armistice lines.”99 In
continuation, neither the Security Council nor the General
Assembly called upon Israel to withdraw to the armistice
lines established in 1949 following the Six Day War.

http://www.defensibleborders.org/apx2.htm (adhering to Israel's
claim for "major Israeli population centers" bordering both Israel
and the West Bank, a.k.a settlement blocks would remain Israeli);
see also U.S. Senate and House of Representatives Approve
Commitments to Israel in President Bush's Letter
of April 14, 2004 (H. Con. Res. 460), available at
http://www.defensibleborders.org/apx3.htm; See also US recognize
settlement blocs, PM says, Israel Hayom, August 2, 2011 (for
President Obama's presumable adoption of this assurance), available
at http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=562.
98
Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, 5740-1979/80, 34
L.S.I. 209 (1979-1980) (Isr.) (reflecting Israel's resumption of
sovereignty over unified Jerusalem); Ne'emaney Har-Habait v.
Attorney General, 47(v) P.D. 221 (1994); See sources in supra note
65; see also Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 92-93; But see the
United Nations critique over what was interpreted by both measures
as attempts to annex East Jerusalem unilaterally and illegally.
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Lapidoth, supra note 94, at 296-97.
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Regrettably, it should be added, the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion of 2004 concerning the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory provided no analytical answer to these
demanding concerns.100 To be sure, in full support by the
Palestinian and Israeli parties to the Oslo Accords, neither
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) nor the
Palestinian Authority (PA) established a defined territory
for the future Palestinian state.101 Palestine’s borders were
one of the permanent status issues left unresolved by Oslo I
Accord subject to Resolution 242’s borders model.102
Article I titled "Aim of Negotiations" within the Israeli–
Palestinian Oslo I Accord clearly upholds a Palestinian
commitment to comply with Resolutions 242 and 338. In
particular, Article I reads that the Oslo Accords would lead
to “a permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.”103
Furthermore, Article I
reemphasizes that “[i]t is understood that the interim
arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace
process and that the negotiations on the permanent status
will lead to the implementation of Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.”104
The
borders of
unresolved
control of

Oslo II Accord, to follow, also considered the
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an
permanent status issue, with Israel retaining
external borders.105 Given that additional
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See generally Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
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reiteration of Resolution 242’s borders model, the Oslo II
agreement states: “Neither side shall initiate or take any
step that will change the status of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip pending the outcome of permanent status
negotiations.”106
Further support by both parties as well as the
Quartet members; namely the United Nations, the United
States, the Russian Federation, and the European Union,
was established in 1999. It occurred through the Sharm elSheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of
Outstanding Commitments.
The Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum restated the validity of Resolution 242’s
borders model once again, whereby: “Recognizing the
necessity to create a positive environment for the
negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that
will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
in accordance with the Interim Agreement.”107
Soon after, in a letter of guarantees initiated by the
President of the United States George W. Bush to Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2000, Israel was over and
again reassured that Resolution 242’s borders model was to

and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 557, 561, available
at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html
(hereinafter, Oslo II).
106
Id. at 568.
107
Memorandum from the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of
Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status
Negotiations to the Gov’t of Isr. and PLO, (Sept. 4, 1999), Jewish
Virtual Library (October 27, 2012),
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sharm0999.html.
[hereinafter Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum].
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remain intact henceforth; thereby: “As part of a final peace
settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders,
which should emerge from negotiations between the parties
in accordance with United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.” 108
The United Nations Security Council Resolution
1850 of 2008 reaffirmed its support for the agreements and
negotiations resulting from the 2007 Middle East summit in
Annapolis, Maryland, by declaring “its support for
negotiation…and its commitment to the irreversibility of
the bilateral negotiations….” In support of the Oslo
bilateral contractual framework adhering to the 242 and
338 resolutions borders model, it then further "supports the
parties agreed principles for the bilateral negotiating
process", thereby reassuring, once again, the validity of the
242 and 338 Security Council Resolutions.109
As of 2008, the Palestinians’ initial adherence to
United Nations Security Council resolutions is most
noticeably comparable with the Kosovarian Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 2008. In upholding
Kosovo's UDI, done in the backdrop of failing negotiations
between the involved parties,110 the ICJ nevertheless
108

See Letter from George W. Bush to Ariel Sharon (Apr. 14,
2004), Jewish Virtual Library, (October 27, 2012),
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/USIsrael/bushletter.html.
109
Id. para. 2. (It further “Calls on both parties to… refrain from
any steps that could undermine confidence or prejudice the outcome
of negotiations.”).
110
See Accordance with International Law of the UDI in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, para. 85 (July 22).
“Preamble of the declaration refers to the “years of internationally39

unmistakably reemphasized the binding standard of
compliance with the United Nations Security Council
resolutions. In the latter case, it has been Security Council
Resolution 1244, adopted on June 10, 1999, concerning the
situation in Kosovo.111 The Court analyzed in detail
whether this unilateral secessionist self-determination
violated international law.112 Probably dissimilar to the
Palestinian case, the Court concluded that the Kosovarian
UDI did not violate the Resolution's call on maintaining the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia (then Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) and the other states of the region,
as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2 of UNSCR
1244 (an annex that envisions, inter alia, a Kosovo status
process).113 The Court also upheld that the Kosovarian UDI
did not violate the authorization of the Security Council in
Resolution 1244 of an international civil or military

sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the
question of our future political status” and expressly puts the
declaration in the context of the failure of the final status
negotiations, inasmuch as it states that “no mutually-acceptable
status outcome was possible’.” Id. para. 105. (quoting Kos.
Declaration of Independence, 47 I.L.M. 467, paras. 10-11 (2008).
111
Id. para. 85.
112
Id. (finding that (a) Kosovo's declaration of independence does
not violate international law, (b) Kosovo's declaration of
independence does not violate UN Security Council Resolution
1244, and (c) independence does not violate the Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government).
113
See International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP),
Republic of Serbia, http://www.ic-mat org/icmpworldwide/southeast-europe/republic-of-serbia/ (upholding that
Serbia is the "successor state to what was the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and then Serbia and Montenegro").
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presence in Kosovo (part of Serbia, and then called
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).114
The United Nations General Assembly upheld a
similar adherence to Resolution 242, paraphrased “DisputeOccupied” territorial model proposition, for the Palestinian
secessionist self-determination claim. The United Nations
specifically call upon Palestine to “regain its right to selfdetermination and independence in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations” in archetypical Article 6 to
General Assembly Resolution 48/94 of December 20,1993,
initiated three months after the first Oslo Interim Accord,
within “Importance of the universal realization of the right
of people to self-determination and of the speedy granting
of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the
effective guarantee and observance of human rights.”
Given their continuous and well-established
validity, any ignorance of these resolutions' borders model
upon Israeli competing titles thereof, should be considered
truly questionable.
Instead, these Resolutions could most probably be
considered lex specialis and lex posterior, whereby
overruling the former 181(II) Partition Plan Resolution,
particularly in concerning both parties' competing land
titles. Truly, the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali
did not find a place in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.115 In fact, it is difficult to assess the exact
position or value of lex specialis amongst the many existing
114
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties].
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devices for treaty interpretation in international law.116 The
principle, nonetheless, was systematically practiced both
domestically and at the international level, and serves today
as means for treaty interpretation.117 In short, the conflict of
laws between Resolution 181(II) and the later Resolutions,
242, 338, and 1850, should be resolved whereby the latter
overrule the former. That is, whilst effectively adhering to
concerns over unilateralism over these competing titles, as
well as other peace negotiations issues between the parties.
Both Palestinians and Israelis systematically agreed upon
this interpretive inclination, throughout the Oslo Accords,
until the 2011 Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of
Independence Initiative.
3. Lack of Good Faith by Treaty Infringement
A third group of reservations per Quigley's
incomplete statehood analysis concerns the lack of good
faith practiced by the Palestinian in their depicted treatment
of the abovementioned resolutions. The critique herein
bears special emphasis concerning the Palestinian 2011
Unilateral Declaration of Independence initiative which
followed Quigley's reply article.
116

See, e.g., Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a
Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 Nordic
J. Int'l L. 27, 40-41 (2005). But see Martti Koskenniemi, Study on
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of 'Self-Contained Regimes', International Law Commission, UN
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See, e.g., Anja Lindroos, supra note 116, at 48-64; Joost
Pauwelyn, Conflict Rules of Norms in Public International Law:
How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law 385-439
(2003). For application of the principle of Lex Specialis, see, ICJ,
North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (February
20); Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. 6,
44 (April 12); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 235-36 (July 8).
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Any possible Palestinian rejection of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850
as discussed, would therefore infringe on the international
legal custom of good faith (bona fide) in their application
twofold.118
Firstly, there is an infringement of the Palestinians'
repeated contractual commitment within the Oslo Accords
to abide by Security Council resolution 242 borders model.
Secondly, a more provisional Palestinian infringement
thereof refers to their effectually dismissive interpretation
of Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850 within
their Declaration Plan Application to the Security Council
as the nascent State of Palestine (statu nascendi).
This possible treaty infringement may arguably be
considered equivalent to the applicable duty concerning
treaties under articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.119 The duty to act in
good faith herein has been clearly reaffirmed in Preambular
paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 and later in
Article 300 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
118

On the principle of Good Faith in international Law, see, e.g., Ian
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 18 (2008); The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115, at art.
26. Per possible customary international law application of the
principle, see also International Whaling Commission, Resolution on
Transparency within the International Whaling Commission,
http://iwcoffice.org/cache/downloads/73xlqdrwx0kkkwc8ook0k0gg
o/Resolution%202001.pdf (IWC, constituted by more than 40
member countries, incorporates with the duty of good faith in
international conduct “fairness, reasonableness, integrity and
honesty.”).
119
See, e.g., Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Acts of the Security
Council: Meaning and Standards of Review, 62 Max Planck
Yearbook of United Nations Law 143 (2008).
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of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS).120 Per the latter type of
infringement by the Palestinians – as the nascent State of
Palestine (statu nascendi) - even if Security Council
resolutions are not formally binding treaties upon statu
nascendi, they still might be perceived in substance as
agreements between the interested parties thereof.121
Thus, Palestinian ignorance of Israel's competing
land titles per Security Council Resolution 242 borders
model, via both infringement tracks, while adhering solely
to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181(II) in
their Declaration Application, should constitute bad faith
instead.
To conclude, the first set of critiques concerns the
Palestinian imperfect claim over sections of the West Bank
and possibly East Jerusalem in the backdrop of United
Nations resolutions. Until there is a negotiated solution to
these competing land claims and statehood claim
altogether, these particular sections of occupied West Bank
and East Jerusalem should not be solely regarded as
Palestinian territories, but as disputed occupied ones. As
such the incorporation of these disputed occupied territories
into a Palestinian state, as modeled by Quigley and as done
by the Palestinians upon their 1988 and 2011 UDI
initiatives, remains questionable.
Furthermore, the Palestinian bid for statehood over
the entire West Bank and East Jerusalem casts a legal
shadow over their whole statehood claim given their
minority self governance over less than a fifth of the land.
120
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This land dispute may tentatively question inclusive
Palestinian title within the broader territorial criteria per the
state recognition doctrine altogether.
Like with other rather exceptional cases, such as
with the British Trust Territory of Cameroons, whereby a
particular territory was divided for the purposes of the
exercise of self-determination, the Palestinian right for selfdetermination, it being a Chapters XI colonial territory,
may possibly uphold certain territorial adaptations.122
These reservations to the Palestinian narration of their
complete territorial claim are ever more challenging given
the inconsistence and possibly bad faith they have
manifested, particularly within the Palestinian 2011
Declaration of Independence initiative.
C. Second Disintegration:
Agreements

Violation

of

Bilateral

There is a second group of exceptions to the rule of
territorial integrity and the UPJ doctrine, which Professor
Quigley's analysis largely overlooks throughout his
statehood analysis.
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But see Question of the Comoro Archipelago, G.A. 3161
(XXVIII) (Dec. 14, 1973) (involving the case of the island Mayotte,
part of the Comoros Archipelago – a Chapter XI territory which
became independent in 1975, in which the General Assembly
rejected the wishes of the inhabitants of Mayotte to remain under
French Administration). For recent repetition of its position,
Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte, G.A. Res. 49/18, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/49/18 (Nov. 28, 1994). See also Crawford, State
Practice Report, supra note 19, at 41 referring to Malyn Newitt, The
Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean
48-70 (Westview Press 1984).
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It upholds that parties themselves may agree to alter
the uti possidetis line, both during the process of
acquisition of independence and afterwards, such as
possibly within the Oslo Interim Accords. Yet, instead of
admitting unilateral deviation thereof, the parties in our
case had systematically agreed until the 2011 UDI initiative
to finalize the territorial aspects of Palestinian statehood
through bilateral negotiations. This agreement by the
parties has been depicted above and bears twofold
implications before Palestinian statehood is finalized ex
ante, and through the possible prospect of Palestinian state
succession doctrine ex post.
1. Palestinian Statu nascendi Competing Title
The international status of the Palestinian Authority
or the PLO and its ability to enter into legally binding
treaties is not solely dependent on Israel's recognition of
alleged Palestinian statehood.123 Yet it could be seen to be
so in part. Put differently, the 2011 Palestinian Unilateral
Declaration of Independence initiative, alongside Quigley's
earlier analysis of the matter may arguably conflict, at least
in part, with the Palestinian Authority's obligations under
the Oslo Interim Accords binding the parties to bilateral
negotiations over the abovementioned competing territorial
claims. However, Israel’s recognition may be seen as
necessary because the 2011 Palestinian Unilateral
Declaration of Independence initiative and Quigley’s
123

Eyal Benvenisti, The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of
Principles: A Framework for Future Settlement, 4 EUR. J. INT'L. L.
542, 544 (1993) (arguing accordingly to respect to the P.L.O.'s
signing of the Oslo I Accord).
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analysis of the matter both conflict with the Palestinian
Authority’s obligations to engage in bilateral negotiations
regarding competing territorial claims under the Oslo
Interim Accords.
At the outset, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969 defines several elements, that if satisfied,
would serve to distinguish a legally binding “treaty” such
as the Oslo Interim Accords, from nonbinding
”agreements” or “memoranda of understanding.”124
In our case, Israel and the Palestinian Authority
have not signed the Vienna Convention. The Vienna
Convention nevertheless offers useful depository codified
customary international legal rules in determining whether
the Oslo Accords are legally binding between these
parties.125 Noticeably, the most controversial requirement
in relation to the Oslo Accords embodies the notion that
“the Convention does not apply to all international
agreements, only those between States.”126 The final
requirement by the Vienna Convention explicitly does not
cover “agreements between States and ‘other subjects of
124

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115,
art. 2(1)(a). For discussion on the binding force of the Oslo accords,
see GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000);
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(2000).
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international law.’127 Unfortunately, the Vienna Convention
leaves the concept of what constitutes a “State”
undefined.128 Even though the Palestinian Authority and the
PLO do not seem to satisfy the test of statehood, the Vienna
Convention recognizes that agreements between “other
subjects of international law” may still be binding.129
Indeed, Article 3 states that “[t]he fact that the present
Convention does not apply to international agreements
concluded between States and other subjects of
international law . . . shall not affect . . . the legal force of
such agreements.”130 Though the Vienna Convention does
not define “other subjects of international law,” its history
indicates that Article 3 was intended to allow states to enter
into legally binding treaties with international organizations
and entities such as insurgent groups, without these
agreements being precluded from being binding by the
Vienna Convention.131 To be sure, several commentators
have claimed that the PLO is a “subject of international
law,” thus allowing the possibility that the Oslo Accords
are legally binding under the Vienna Convention.132
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WATSON, supra note 124, at 91 (citing 2 Yb. I.L.C. 162 (1962)
(Commentary on draft Article I, sec. 8). The Convention still
recognizes that agreements with other subjects of international law
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See e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 126, at 543-44 (claiming that
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Professor Geoffrey Watson adds that there is a
moment at which a sub-state entity, such as the Palestinian
Authority, may yet begin to bind itself by international
agreements, even though it may lack complete
sovereignty.133 Like Israel in this present case, when
colonies sign agreements with their former governing
states, this moment typically occurs prior to complete
independence.134 Professor Quigley again rather disregards
this proposition; thereby he fails to incorporate Israel's
competing territorial claims over occupied West Bank and
East Jerusalem and Palestinian lack of self-governance
thereof altogether.
Indeed, binding the Palestinians to the Oslo Accords
follows much state practice. Thus, throughout the twentieth
century there are plentiful examples of states entering into
legally binding agreements with sub-state actors.135 To
illustrate, Great Britain entered into agreements with the
National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South
Yemen in 1967 and the African National Council in
1979.136 Likewise, France concluded a treaty with the Front
de Libération Nationale Algérien as part of its withdrawal
from Algeria in 1962.137 Moreover, in 1974 Portugal
entered a binding agreement with the Mozambique
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WATSON, supra note 124, at 92.
Id. Professor Watson further explains that as a practical matter,
States would have less incentive to enter into agreements with substate. State entities if they were not binding, since there would be no
legal assurance of mutual performance.
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Liberation Front.138 Lastly, even the United States has
entered into agreements with the P.L.O., such as the
Agreement on Encouragement of Investment, signed in
1994.139
Certainly, these treaties are only binding if the
parties actually intended to be bound.140 According to the
International Law Commission's commentary, the phrase
“governed by international law” embraces the element of
an “intention to create obligations under international
law”.141 If there is no such intention the instrument will not
be a treaty. In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case,
noticeably, the International Court of Justice considered the
terms of a joint communiqué issued by the Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers, and the particular circumstances
in which it was drawn up, in order to determine its
nature.142 The Court found that there had been no intention
to conclude an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Court.143
In the case of the Oslo Accords, and prior to the
2011 Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of Independence
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initiative, the parties clearly signaled their intent to be
legally bound.144
Lastly, neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian parties
have terminated the agreements nor have they called for
that.145 In balance, according to the Vienna Convention,
parties cannot denunciate or withdraw from a treaty that
does not contain a termination provision.146 The only
exception, dissimilar from any official Palestinian narration
of the Oslo Accords, is when a party can establish that it
intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal or if this possibility was implied by the nature
of the treaty. Moreover, customary international law of
treaties adds that a party, such as the Palestinian one, would
be unable to withdraw from a treaty that transfers territory
or establishes a boundary, except in the highly unlikely
event of the treaty allowing for this.147 Customary
international law clearly establishes that any infringement
of the abovementioned customary rule of withdrawal might
make little or no legal difference.148
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In particular, moreover, though the Oslo Accords
envisioned resolution of permanent status issues by May 4,
1999, neither of the Oslo agreements contained a
termination clause, nor a provision that the agreements
would no longer be in effect if a permanent status
settlement was not reached.149 Instead, in both the text of
the agreements and the actions of the parties until the 2011
Palestinian UDI initiative, the parties described the Oslo
peace process as “irreversible,” thus complying with the
contradictory observation.”150
Because this is expressed as an exception, the
obligation is placed on the party wishing to invoke it, in
this case, the Palestinian one.151 Unless another period is
established, that party must give the other party or parties at
least twelve months' notice of its intention, as clearly stated
in Article 56(2) to the Vienna Convention. Needless to say,
the Palestinians did not issue any such statement nor did
they announce intentions to do so. Professor Antony Aust
further adds that because it is very common to include
provisions on withdrawal, when a treaty is silent it may be
much harder for a party – such as the Palestinian one - to
establish the grounds for an exception.152
To conclude, although the 1969 Convention does
not apply to treaties between states and international
organizations, such as a host country agreement, insofar as
the rules of the Convention reflect the rules of customary
international law applicable to treaties with international
organizations, they continuously apply in the present
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case.153 If so, any deviation or withdrawal from the Oslo
Interim Accords by the Palestinians, through the 2011 UDI
initiative, concerning the territorial criteria for statehood
and disputed occupied territories are therefore questionable,
but overlooked in Professor Quigley's analysis.
2. Of Palestinian State Succession
Within the second group of treaty law exceptions to
the rule of territorial integrity and the UPJ doctrine, which
Professor Quigley's analysis ignores, exists a second
critique. This critique concerns the prospect whereby
Palestinian statehood already exists or may soon exist, and
a future Palestinian state would dismiss Israel's competing
land title ex post facto, presumably applying the state
succession doctrine.
State succession, surely, is the term used to refer to
the complex of legal issues that arise when there is a
change of sovereignty with respect to a particular
territory.154 The concern of the law of state succession is
with the consequences of a change of sovereignty in fields
such as succession to treaties, state property, archives and
debt, and the nationality of natural and legal persons.155 A
state which acquires territory, or a new state which comes
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into existence after a succession, such as the Palestinian
state, is referred to as a ”successor state,” and the state
which has lost territory, such as Israel, is referred to as the
“predecessor state.”156 It should be stressed that the law of
state succession assumes that a change of sovereignty has
occurred in accordance with international law, which as
previously explained would be highly questionable in the
present case following the two Palestinian UDI initiatives
henceforth.157
Yet, even if a Palestinian state is already said to
exist, then the new Palestinian state will succeed without
any further action to the Oslo Accords. The Palestinian
state will arguably succeed at least to the legal situation
created by them. This state succession customary principle
concerns in particular Israel's effective governance of
occupied territories, under competing Israeli title especially
according to the United Nations Resolutions 242, 338, and
1850. State succession is a well-established principle, yet
its exact extent is not.158 More particularly, since the
Second World War, the practice of newly independent
countries replacing former colonies has not been
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consistent.159 It is therefore impossible to promulgate a set
of rules of customary law on state succession applicable in
such situations.
With that said, Quigley's 1988 Palestinian statehood
argument possibly falters treaty law herein. To begin with,
the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in
respect of Treaties provides that a successor state will
automatically succeed to all of its predecessor’s treaties
according to Art. 34(1)(a). Importantly, in the case of socalled “newly independent states,” defined basically as
former colonies,160 the rule would still apply.161
In balance however, two theories of state succession
did evolve and led to state practice, which may be applied
in our case. The first is the clean slate doctrine,162 whereby
the new state is free to pick and choose which treaties it
will succeed to. This approach was followed most famously
by the United States when it gained its independence.163 As
explained, the doctrine however did not apply thus far to
cases whereby treaties concerned territorial rights, such as
Israel's competing territorial titles embodied into the 242
borders' model. In the latter cases, state practice led new
states to normally be bound by former treaties thereof.164
A second even wider theoretical structure over state
succession and practice evolved around the nineteenth
159
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century and henceforth is referred to as “universal
succession.” It persisted up to the 1960s. Accordingly, the
new state inherited all the treaty rights and obligations of
the former power in so far as they had been applicable to
the territory before independence. For example, this
approach was reflected in the devolution agreements
entered into by Iraq in 1931 and by some former Asian
colonies in the 1940s and 1950s. To further illustrate, from
1955, all former British colonies in West Africa, except for
Gambia, concluded devolution agreements with the United
Kingdom.165 These provided that, as from the date of
independence, all obligations and responsibilities of the
United Kingdom which arose from “any valid international
instrument” would be assumed by the new state “in so far
as such instruments may be held to have application” to it;
and the rights and benefits previously enjoyed by the
United Kingdom by virtue of the application of such
instruments to the former colony would be enjoyed by the
new state.166 Similarly, most French colonies in Africa
regarded themselves as successors to pre-independence
treaties, and made declarations to that effect, which they
notified to the United Nations Secretary General.167
To conclude, a future Palestinian state may not
easily ignore its bilateral commitment towards negotiation
of secure borders with Israel. That is, given solid state
practice applying the state succession doctrine in favour of
commitment to the Oslo Accords' borders model as
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constituted by the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850.
Conclusion
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242,
338, and 1850 all provide for the legal framework for a
future negotiated two-state solution. The international
community steadily supports these legal instruments. This
framework also mandates that bilateral direct negotiations
achieve a comprehensive peace agreement between all the
parties to the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the
Palestinians. The 2005 Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip, as well as certain negotiated withdrawals from
additional Palestinian territory within the West Bank, may
give room for certain confidence that such negotiations
may finally lead to a two state solution living side by side
in peace and security. Earlier successfully negotiated peace
agreements between Israel and its Egyptian and Jordanian
neighbours may reiterate that expectation.
Yet, with less than a fifth of the territory over which
the Palestinians presently practice self-governance in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem, and in the backdrop of
Israel's competing title over strategic segments, it remains
truly questionable whether a unilateral bypass on
Palestinian statehood over the entire alleged Palestinian
territory, even including the separate Hamas-governed
Gaza Strip, would withstand Israel's territorial integrity and
the rule of public international law.
In reply to Professor John Quigley, this article
considers two set of arguments which further question
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Quigley's justification for Palestinian territorial claims and
possibly Palestinian statehood altogether. These refer to
arguable Palestinian violations of pivotal United Nations
resolutions over territorial aspects. These also refer to
Palestinian violation of the bilateral Oslo Interim
Agreements, especially in the backdrop of the second
Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of Independence
initiative in 2011. In conclusion, Quigley's unilateral
Palestinian statehood proposition is not only deeply legally
questionable, but may further exacerbate existing political
controversies to the detriment of both Israelis and
Palestinians alike.
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